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Case No. 890033-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
- — 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — — 
CARRIE JO LAW, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT FRANK LAW, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
M. LYNNE LARSON, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
000O000—-
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
000O000 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is a continuation of a divorce action in which the 
former wife engaged in collection proceedings against certain 
property in which Appellant has an interest. Appellant was 
therefore granted leave to intervene in the action to protect her 
interests. Her complaint in intervention was, thereafter, 
dismissed for no cause of action and it is from that order of 
dismissal that Intervenor appeals. Jurisdiction for this Court 
to decide appeals relating to divorce actions is conferred by 
Section 78-2a-4(2)(h) U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented in this Appeal are as follows: 
(a) Are there genuine and material issues of fact to be 
decided concerning the status of monies which have been earned as 
a result of the sale or rental of real property by a licensed 
real estate agent working for a broker; and did the District 
Court err in granting summary judgment without trying those 
issues? 
(b) Does Intervenorfs amended complaint in intervention 
set forth valid causes of action upon which she may be granted 
relief as prayed for in that amended complaint in intervention? 
STATUTORY AND RULE PROVISIONS 
61-2-10 U.C.A. - Restriction on Commissions -
Affiliation with more than one broker. 
It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales 
agent to accept valuable consideration for the 
performance of any of the acts specified in this chapter 
from any person except the principal broker with whom he 
is affiliated and licensed. An inactive licensee is 
not authorized to conduct real estate transactions until 
he becomes affiliated with a licensed principal broker. 
No sales agent or associate broker may affiliate with 
more than one principal broker at the same time. Except 
as provided by rule, a principal broker may not be 
responsible for more than one real estate brokerage at 
that same time. 
61-2-18 U.C.A. - Actions for Recovery of Compensation 
Restricted. 
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in 
any court of this state for the recovery of a 
commission, fee, or compensation for any act under this 
chapter to other than licensed principal brokers, unless 
the person was duly licensed as a principal broker at 
the time of the doing of the act or rendering the 
service. 
( 2 ) N o s a 1 e s a g e n t o r a s s o c i a t e b r o k e r m a y s u e i 1:1 
h I s o wn n a m e f o r t h e r e c o v e r y f e e , c o mm 1 s s i 0 n , 0 r 
compensation for services as a sales agent or associate 
broker unless the action is against the principal broker 
with whom he is or was licensed. Any action for the 
recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation may 
only be instituted and brought by the principal broker 
with whom the sales agent or associate broker is 
affiliated. 
. . ueien:-' - 1.. : ) .ections. 
v_, II «>w presented. Every defense, in ' ^  • 
fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if 
one is required, except that the following defenses may 
at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) 
lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, (2) lack 
of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) 
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service 
of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which 
r e 1 i e f c a n b e g r a n t e d , ( 7 ) f a 1 1 -\ - r* * : * ; 
indispensable p a r t y
 e A motion making any o t these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a farther 
pleading is permitted. No defense or o b j e c t i o n i s 
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by 
further pleading after the denial of such motion or 
objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim, for relief 
to which the adverse party is not required to serve a 
responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any 
defense in law or fact to that claim, for relief.. If, on, 
a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss 
for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Ra'e 56, and all parties 
shall be g i v e 1:1 reasonable opport-jnitv to present all 
material made pertinent to such - *: .: * - "ule 56 
Rule " !5 U.R,C.P• - Summary judgment 
;' I For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon 
.1 v. 1 aim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment m a y , a t a, n y t. i m e a f t e r the 
expiration of 20 days £ r o m the commencement of the 
action or after service of a motion for summary judgment 
by the adverse party, move with or without supporting 
a f f i d a v i t s for a summary judgment in h i s favor upon a l l 
or any p a r t t he reo f . 
(b) For d e f e n d i n g p a r t y . A p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a 
c l a i m , c o u n t e r c l a i m , or c r o s s - c l a i m i s a s s e r t e d or a 
d e c l a r a t o r y judgment i s s o u g h t , may a t any t i m e , move 
w i t h or w i t h o u t s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t s fo r a summary 
judgment i n h i s f a v o r a s t o a l l or any p a r t t h e r e o f . 
( c ) Mot ion and p r o c e e d i n g s t h e r e o n . The mot ion 
s h a l l be s e r v e d a t l e a s t 10 days b e f o r e t h e t i m e f i x e d 
fo r t h e h e a r i n g . The a d v e r s e p a r t y p r i o r t o t h e day of 
h e a r i n g may s e r v e o p p o s i n g a f f i d a v i t s . The judgmen t 
s o u g h t s h a l l be r e n d e r e d f o r t h w i t h i f t h e p l e a d i n g s , 
d e p o s i t i o n s , answers to i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and admiss ions 
on f i l e , t o g e t h e r with the a f f i d a v i t s , i f any, show t h a t 
t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and 
t h a t t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment as a 
m a t t e r of l aw . A summary j u d g m e n t , i n t e r l o c u t o r y i n 
c h a r a c t e r , may be r e n d e r e d on t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y 
a l o n e a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s a g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o t h e amount 
of damages. 
(d) Case no t f u l l y a d j u d i c a t e d on m o t i o n . I f on 
motion under t h i s r u l e judgment i s not rendered upon t h e 
who le c a s e or f o r a l l t h e r e l i e f a sked and a t r i a l i s 
n e c e s s a r y , t h e c o u r t a t t h e h e a r i n g of t h e m o t i o n , by 
examining the p l e a d i n g s and the ev idence before i t and 
by i n t e r r o g a t i n g c o u n s e l , s h a l l i f p r a c t i c a b l e a s c e r t a i n 
w h a t m a t e r i a l f a c t s e x i s t w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i a l 
c o n t r o v e r s y and what m a t e r i a l f a c t s a re a c t u a l l y and in 
good f a i t h c o n t r o v e r t e d . I t s h a l l t h e r e u p o n make an 
o r d e r s p e c i f y i n g t h e f a c t s t h a t a p p e a r w i t h o u t 
s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r o v e r s y , i n c l u d i n g the e x t e n t to which 
t h e a m o u n t of d a m a g e s o r o t h e r r e l i e f i s n o t i n 
c o n t r o v e r s y , and d i r e c t i n g such f u r t h e r p roceed ings in 
t h e a c t i o n a s a r e j u s t . Upon t h e t r i a l of t h e a c t i o n 
the f a c t s so s p e c i f i e d s h a l l be deemed e s t a b l i s h e d , and 
the t r i a l s h a l l be conducted a c c o r d i n g l y . 
(e) Form of a f f i d a v i t s ; f u r t h e r t e s t imony ; defense 
r e q u i r e d . Suppor t ing and opposing a f f i d a v i t s s h a l l be 
made on p e r s o n a l knowledge, s h a l l s e t f o r t h such f a c t s 
a s would be a d m i s s i b l e i n e v i d e n c e , and s h a l l show 
a f f i r m a t i v e l y t h a t t he a f f i a n t i s competent to t e s t i f y 
t o t h e m a t t e r s s t a t e d t h e r e i n . Sworn or c e r t i f i e d 
c o p i e s of a l l papers or p a r t s t he r eo f r e f e r r e d to in an 
a f f i d a v i t s h a l l be a t t a c h e d t h e r e t o or s e rved t h e r e w i t h . 
The c o u r t may p e r m i t a f f i d a v i t s t o be s u p p l e m e n t e d or 
opposed by d e p o s i t i o n s , answers to i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , or 
f u r t h e r a f f i d a v i t s . When a motion for summary judgment 
i s made and s u p p o r t e d a s p r o v i d e d i n t h i s r u l e , an 
a c i v e r s e p a r t y may n o t r e s 1: i ipon t:he m e r e -il l e g a t i o n s or 
d e n i a l s o f h i s p l e a d i n g , but h i s r e s p o n s e , by a f f i d a v i t s 
or a s o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d i n t h i s r u l e , m u s t s e t f o r t h 
s p e c i f i c f a c t s s h o w i n g t h a t t h e r e i s a g e n u i n e i s s u e f o r 
t r i a 1 I f h e d o e s n o t s o r e s p o n d , summa r y j u d g m e n t , i f 
a p p r o p r i a t e , s h a l l be e n t e r e d a g a i n s t h im. 
( f ) When a f f i d a v i t s a r e u n a v a i l a b l e . S h o u l d i t 
a p p e a r f r o m t h e a £ f i d a v i t s • ::»£ a p a r t y o p p o s i n g t h e 
m o t i o n t h a t he c a n n o t f or r e a s o n s s t a t e d p r e s e n t by 
a f f i d a v i t f a c t s e s s e n t i a l t o j u s t i f y h i s o p p o s i t i o n , t h e 
c o u r t may r e f u s e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r j u d g m e n t or may 
o r d e r a c o n t i n u a n c e t o p e r m i t a f f i d a v i t s t o be o b t a i n e d 
o r d e p o s i t i o n s t o be t a k e n o r d i s c o v e r y t o be h a d o r may 
make s u c h o t h e r o r d e r a s i s j u s t , 
( g ) A f f i d a v i t s made i n bad f a i t h . S h o u l d i t 
a p p e a r t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t a t a n y t i m e t h a t 
a n y o f t h e a f f i d a v i t s p r e s e n t e d p u r s u a n t t o t h i s r u l e 
a r e p r e s e n t e d i n bad f a i t h or s o l e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e of 
d e l a y , t h e c o u r t s h a l l f o r t h w i t h o r d e r t h e p a r t y 
e m p l o y i n g t h e m t o pay t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y t h e a m o u n t o f 
t h e r e a s o n a b 1 e e x p e n s e s wh I c h t h e £ i 1 i n g o f t h e 
a f f i d a v i t s c a u s e d h im t o i n c u r , i n c l u d i n g r e a s o n a b l e 
a t t o r n e y f s f e e s , and any o f f e n d i n g p a r t y o r a t t o r n e y may 
be a d j u d g e d g u i l t y of c o n t e m p t . 
T h i s */.irf ; r i g i n ^ l ^ , *- a c t i o n b e t w e e n r . a r r ' ^ 
. a i ) e i e n d a n t o e x o w a 
R e s p o n d e n t s ^ r - •;-* i -^ «i i~ - " i - ^ « * - - > - ^ b e t w e e n t 
p a r t i s - ** * *. * o ij c? t* f> ? ) M 8 s ;
 (? c U S ? ) ' ** H ^, - r ^ ^ * f i i v 
D • 1 
d e c r e e p r o v i d e ' " • f * o •-> s!; a t I o - * \ - r ; c : 1 v t l i 
e r * . i • e r i o o O L u m e , R u u e r * * ' i t i i e t h e Sii ' 
$ 7 5 ? ( ) ' ' . t o ^ Y t i n g u i s h a n y "* . . •, ^ .:; ,„UJ<* *•« ^ ^ «t--, ; 
( R t ' ' ' H r r i r* \ a * w i s u i i d e d * .-, -* • > ' ,- o : t ' i^ f • • v : n <• 
- n i l - • * * : ^ 
p e r m o n t h a s c h i l d s u p p o r t f o r e a c h >* * . h o s e c n i l a r e n (ti,ib), { 
September 14, 1987, a judgment was entered against Robert, in 
behalf of Carrie, in the amount of $6,500,00 for delinquent child 
support plus $350.00 attorneyfs fees (R.36-37). On April 27, 
1988, an additional judgment was rendered against Robert, in 
behalf of Carrie, in the amount of $75,000.00 for payments due as 
division of marital property, plus $1,500.00 in attorneyfs fees. 
Robert Law is a licensed real estate broker, operating 
under the name of Acres West Real Estate, and doing business in 
Millard County. Carrie, in an attempt to collect sums due to her 
under the judgments referred to above, caused writs of 
garnishment to be issued, in June, 1988, against three banks and 
two title insurance companies (R.100-122). The garnishment 
against Utah Title Company brought a reply that a real estate 
commission was due to Acres West Real Estate in the amount of 
$1,350.00 (R.121). Security Title Co. answered that, while no 
sums were due at that particular time, preliminary work had been 
done on some transactions, and that money might become due in the 
near future. Shortly thereafter, Robert moved to stay execution 
on the garnishment of Utah Title Co. (R.123) and accompanied his 
motion with an affidavit of his real estate agent, M. Lynne 
Larson. That affidavit stated that she was totally responsible 
for the sale and listing of the property on which the commission 
was due, and that she was due expenses and a commission in the 
amount of $702.00, out of the money attached by the garnishment 
• : f ( 11: a 1: i T I, t J e (3 :> III p a n 5 (R 1 2 5 ) 
111 r e s p o 11 s e t o R o b e r t f : : 0 •:-1 " t: o s t a y e x e c 111 i 0 n , C a r r i e 
f i l e d a mo t i o n f o r o r d e r i n a ±a o i e x e c u t i o n ; R« I '-* ? - 1 i ? s e e k i n g 
a n o r d e r t o s e v e n t i t: 1 e 2 n s u ^ ^ n ^ f t c o m p a n i e s , \ \ r -*.- r \ n t , t 0 
' • • n < -, - * * - V v ^ ^ t R p q i V s t a t e ' 1 r * - • " i e 
e 
a g e n w i r k i n g *- *  * *. E s t a t e i i r s •*
 f t i l e d 
mo : , s 
b e i n u f 1 i -* <1 ~ ' • t > b e r • ** - s o m e t i m e a f t e ' * n f- * e s p ) n s e 
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d e c i s i o n w a b- i s s u e d g r a n t i n g t n p n , * 1 n - , f > *. o u r) « ~ . f o r 
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dismiss or for summary judgment, by filing a memorandum and case 
law attachments (R.186-206). 
Oral arguments were held on the motions in front of a Judge 
Pro tem, John Wahlquist, on November, 1988, resulting in an order 
granting Intervener's motion to file an amended complaint and 
immediately dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action 
(R.232). While the clerk was ordered to file the amended 
complaint in intervention, it was never actually filed, and a 
copy is therefore inserted as an addendum hereto. 
Prior to the filing of the formal order, Intervenor moved, 
pursuant to Rule 59 U.R.C.P., to amend the order for error in 
law. The assigned Judge, Ray M. Harding, ruled by memorandum 
decision (R.229) that he had no jurisdiction to set aside the 
ruling of another Judge, and the order of Judge Wahlquist was 
entered. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant and Intervenor raises three issues for decision 
by this Court. First, Appellant argues that the Court's order of 
dismissal for failure to state a cause of action was in error 
under the Utah Supreme Court decisions regarding such dismissals. 
Secondly, Appellant argues that the statutes cited by 
Carrie Law in the Court below, regarding a real estate agent's 
right to recovery of compensation, were erroneously construed to 
change ownership of the compensation from the sales agent to the 
broker. 
Thirdly, Intervenor contends that, regardless of the legal 
ownership of the compensation due to her as a sales agent, she is 
entitled to the equitable relief of a resulting trust over the 
money that she has earned as a real estate sales agent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING INTERVENORTS 
AMENDED COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
In the Court below, Plaintiff Carrie Law brought a motion 
to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment, after 
Intervenor had filed her original complaint. The original 
complaint cited one cause of action, claiming that sixty percent 
of certain commissions due to Acres West Real Estate were due to 
her as the listing and selling agent, under a contractual 
agreement between her and her broker, Robert Law. The motion to 
dismiss was made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis that 
Intervenor had not stated a cause of action in her complaint. In 
the alternative, a summary judgment was asked for pursuant to 
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. The motion was supported by a memorandum in 
which neither procedural rule was discussed. No affidavits 
were filed in support of the motion, though a brief four-
paragraph statement of facts was included in the memorandum. The 
entire argument of the memorandum was directed at the single 
cause of action contained in the first complaint in intervention 
filed by Intervenor. In the oral arguments on the motion to 
dismiss, counsel for Carrie Law admitted that she had not had 
time to review the proposed amended complaint and was not yet 
ready to respond to it* She also indicated that the new cause of 
action appeared to bring up questions of fact which she would 
need time to explore. Counsel thus stated to the Court: 
Now if the Court finds Ms. Larson should be entitled to 
amend the complaint, be joined as an interested party 
and be allowed to amend the complaint, then we need time 
to respond to the amended complaint and to do some 
investigation as to what the nature of the agreements 
were, how much money is at issue, because we have no 
affidavits other than that previously filed by Ms. 
Larson which essentially says that these are real estate 
commissions due from Security Title and really has 
nothing to do with the bank account or anything else. I 
do think that one thing the Court can do today is give 
my client or order a writ of execution for those funds 
that are not in dispute by Ms. Larson (T.15). 
Despite this admission on the part of counsel for 
Plaintiff, the Court ruled that it was ready to dismiss all 
causes of action brought by Intervenor. The Court did this 
despite the fact that it had not read any of the file, including 
the amended complaint sought to be filed by Ms. Larson. The 
Court stated, at the outset of the case: 
I didnft know I was gonna have this calendar until 
Monday, and I am not familiar with this file at all. I 
will let you tell me about it, and we will see what the 
other attorneys say (T.3). 
While the motion was brought, in the alternative, under two 
separate rules of civil procedure, it appears that the Court 
granted the motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P. 
The standard for such a dismissal was recently set forth in the 
case of Arrow Industries, Inc. vs. Zions First National Bank, 99 
Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1988). The standard for such a dismissal 
was defined in the Court's statement: 
A motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled 
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of its claim. In reviewing an order granting 
a motion to dismiss, we are obliged to construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. 
99 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11. 
The Court below did not read the amended complaint. It did 
not read Intervenorfs memorandum of points and authorities or any 
of the case law attached thereto. It did not inquire into the 
specific facts surrounding the claims made by Intervenor. It did 
not even give credence to the statements of counsel for Carrie 
Law that the new cause of action recited by Intervenor needed 
additional study and response. The Court, in reaching its 
completely uninformed decision, ruled in effect that Plaintiff 
would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which 
could be proved. Intervenor contends that the Court could not 
possibly have decided those issues properly in a few minutes of 
oral arguments, without reading the pleadings, without reviewing 
the case law and without knowing the facts. This matter should 
therefore be remanded to the Court below with instructions to 
consider those items before making a decision. 
Dismissals for failure to state a claim of action, pursuant 
t o R u l e 12 U .R .C .P . , a r e v e r y c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o summary 
j u d g m e n t s i n b e h a l f of D e f e n d a n t , p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 56 U.R.C.P. 
W h i l e t h e C o u r t b e l o w , i n i t s f i n a l o r d e r , c h a r a c t e r i z e d i t s 
o r d e r as one of d i s m i s s a l , i t a p p e a r s a p p r o p r i a t e t o r e v i e w t h e 
s i t u a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 56 U.R.C.P. a l s o . In t h e p r e v i o u s l y 
c i t e d case of Arrow I n d u s t r i e s v s . Zions F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank, t he 
Court went on to say the f o l l o w i n g about summary judgment: 
S i m i l a r l y , when r u l i n g on an a p p e a l from a mot ion f o r 
summary j u d g m e n t , we i n q u i r e w h e t h e r t h e r e i s any 
g e n u i n e i s s u e as t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and , i f t h e r e i s 
n o t , whether the moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d to judgment as 
a m a t t e r of l aw . In r e v i e w i n g t h e r e c o r d on an a p p e a l 
from a summary judgment, t he Court t r e a t s t he s t a t e m e n t s 
and e v i d e n c i a r y m a t e r i a l s of t he A p p e l l a n t as i f a j u ry 
would r e c e i v e them as t h e o n l y c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e and 
s u s t a i n s t h e judgment o n l y i f no i s s u e s of f a c t which 
cou ld a f f e c t t he outcome can be d i s c e r n e d . 99 Utah Adv. 
Rep. a t 1 1 . 
A p p e l l a n t a s s e r t s t h a t , unde r t h e s e p a r a t e s t a n d a r d s e t 
f o r t h above , t he Cour t ' s o rde r g r a n t i n g r e l i e f to C a r r i e Law, can 
a l s o no t be s u s t a i n e d . S imply p u t , t h e Cour t d id n o t h a v e any 
f a c t s in f ron t of i t from which i t cou ld r u l e t h a t t h e r e were no 
genuine i s s u e s of f a c t and t h a t the moving p a r t y was e n t i t l e d to 
judgment a s a m a t t e r of l a w . I t i s t r u e t h a t a n a r r a t i v e 
s t a t e m e n t was made by C a r r i e ' s a t t o r n e y i n t h e n a t u r e of 
background on the c a s e , for a judge who knew no th ing of i t . That 
background, however, was i n s u f f i c i e n t to a p p r i s e the Court of a l l 
nece s sa ry f a c t s to f u l l y dec ide the i s s u e . As p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , 
c o u n s e l f o r C a r r i e Law a d m i t t e d t h a t she was n o t c o m p l e t e l y 
informed of the facts upon which Intervenor relied to assert her 
claims. Under either standard, therefore, the Court's order of 
dismissal must be reversed. 
II. INTERVENOR M. LYNNE LARSON IS A REAL PARTY IN 
INTEREST WHOSE CLAIMS ARE ENTITLED TO BE CONSIDERED BY 
THE COURT; AND SHE IS NOT BARRED FROM ASSERTING THOSE 
CLAIMS. 
Intervener's first cause of action makes claim that 
Intervenor, as a licensed real estate sales agent, working with 
Acres West Real Estate in which Defendant Robert Law is the 
broker, listed and sold certain properties from which commissions 
were due. These commissions were paid into Security Title 
Company of Millard County or Utah Title Company to be paid over 
to Acres West Real Estate. The contractual arrangement made 
between the broker and his real estate agent was that, in cases 
where the real estate agent both listed and sold the properties, 
she was entitled to sixty percent of the commission, and the 
agency was entitled to forty percent. Carrie Law, in her motion 
to dismiss, cited Section 61-2-10 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) which 
purports to require a sales agent to accept his commission only 
from the broker. She also cited Section 61-2-18 U.C.A. (1953, as 
amended) which prevents a sales agent from maintaining a legal 
action in her own name for the collection of a commission due. 
Plaintiff therefore contends that title to the money must pass to 
the broker prior to passing to the sales agent, and that, while 
title is so passing, it is reachable by the creditors of the 
b r o k e r . 
The Utah L e g i s l a t u r e passed the s t a t u t e s c i t e d by P l a i n t i f f 
i n an a t t e m p t t o r e g u l a t e t h e r e a l e s t a t e s a l e s b u s i n e s s . I t 
r e q u i r e s a r e a l e s t a t e a g e n t t o work unde r t h e d i r e c t i o n of a 
b r o k e r who i s l i c e n s e d and bonded by t h e s t a t e S e c u r i t i e s 
C o m m i s s i o n . The s t a t u t e d o e s n o t p u r p o r t t o c h a n g e t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p be tween a b r o k e r and a s a l e s p e r s o n , bu t o n l y t o 
r e g u l a t e t h o s e who s e l l r e a l e s t a t e and t o p r o t e c t b u y e r s and 
s e l l e r s a g a i n s t i m p r o p e r c o n d u c t . Tha t r u l e was s t a t e d i n t h e 
case of G loba l Rec rea t i on v s . Cedar H i l l s Development, 614 P.2d 
155 (Utah 1980) as f o l l o w s : 
The p u r p o s e of t h o s e p r o v i s i o n s i s no t t o p r o t e c t r e a l 
e s t a t e d e v e l o p e r s who s e e k r e l i e f f rom t h e i r own 
c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s ; r a t h e r , i t i s f o r t h e 
p r o t e c t i o n of members of the p u b l i c who r e l y on l i c e n s e d 
r e a l e s t a t e b roke r s and sa lesmen to perform t a s k s t h a t 
r e q u i r e a h i g h d e g r e e of h o n e s t y and i n t e g r i t y . The 
l i c e n s i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s and t h e p r o v i s i o n s d e s i g n e d t o 
enforce compl iance t h e r e w i t h a r e des igned to a s s u r e such 
hones ty and i n t e g r i t y . 614 P.2d a t 158. 
In t h e Utah Supreme Cour t c a s e of Young v s . Buchanan , 259 
P.2d 875 (Utah 1953) the Court h e l d t h a t a s a l e s agreement under 
which a s a l e s agent c la imed a commission must have been between 
t h e s e l l e r and b roke r . In r u l i n g so , however, t he Court s t a t e d : 
" I t may w e l l be t h a t P l a i n t i f f i s t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t - -
p r o v i d i n g any l e g a l c l a im whatsoever e x i s t s a g a i n s t the 
d e f e n d a n t . f t 259 P.2d a t 878 . In t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , i n i t s 
memorandum d e c i s i o n of O c t o b e r 14, 1988 , t h e Cour t found t h a t 
I n t e r v e n o r did have a c l a i m which she should be a l lowed to a s s e r t : 
The Cour t h a v i n g c o n s i d e r e d Lynne L a r s o n f s mot ion t o 
i n t e r v e n e w i l l g r an t t h a t motion. 
R u l e 24 of t h e Utah R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e a l l o w s 
i n t e r v e n t i o n as of r i g h t "when the a p p l i c a n t c l a i m s an 
i n t e r e s t r e l a t i n g to the p rope r ty or t r a n s a c t i o n which 
i s t h e s u b j e c t of t h e a c t i o n . . . . f f Ms. L a r s o n f s c l a i m t o 
p a r t of t h e money i n t h e bank a c c o u n t c e r t a i n l y g i v e s 
her the r e q u i r e d i n t e r e s t in the p r o p e r t y . 
The C o u r t i s c o n c e r n e d t h a t Ms. L a r s o n seems t o be 
r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s i n t e r v e n t i o n a c t i o n by t h e 
p l a i n t i f f f s a t t o r n e y [ A c t u a l l y D e f e n d a n t s a t t o r n e y was 
r e p r e s e n t i n g h e r . ] . B e c a u s e of t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r 
c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t , the Court would sugges t t h a t Ms. 
Larson o b t a i n her own independent counse l (R.167). 
The l o w e r Cour t t h u s a g r e e d w i t h t h e p ronouncemen t of t h e 
Utah Supreme Court in the Young v s . Buchanan case t h a t Ms. Larson 
may w e l l be a r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n . 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, because of the unusua l s i t u a t i o n , the Court 
found a p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t i n a l l o w i n g he r t o even 
p r o c e e d t h r o u g h t h e same a t t o r n e y a s h e r b r o k e r . At t h e 
s u g g e s t i o n of t h e C o u r t , Ms. L a r s o n u n d e r t o o k t o o b t a i n 
independent c o u n s e l . 
A p p e l l a n t admits t h a t t h e r e has been no c l e a r d e c i s i o n by 
t h e A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e c o n c e r n i n g t h e s t a t u s of 
commissions earned by a r e a l e s t a t e agent working with a b roke r . 
In the p r e v i o u s l y c i t e d case of Globa l R e c r e a t i o n , I n c . v s . Cedar 
H i l l s D e v e l o p m e n t Co. , t h e Cour t found t h a t even a l o o s e 
a s s o c i a t i o n be tween a r e a l e s t a t e s a l e s m a n and a b r o k e r was 
s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e r e a l e s t a t e a g e n t t o be a b l e t o c l a i m a 
commission (614 P.2d at 157-8). Thus, the real estate sales 
agent does not need to be an employee of the broker in the usual 
sense. The Court went on to say, "In any event, for a valid 
broker-salesman relationship to exist, it is not necessary that 
the broker receive a portion of the commission paid for the sale 
of a property." 614 P.2d at 158. Applying the general 
principles of the cited Court decisions, it does not follow that 
the broker is the owner of any of the commission earned by a real 
estate sales agent. The statutory restriction on commencing a 
legal action does not deprive a real estate sales agent of her 
property interest and give it to the broker. The public policy 
recited by the Utah Supreme Court as being behind the enactment 
of the statute is not enhanced by ruling that the money belongs 
to the broker first and that it is reachable by ordinary 
creditors of the broker. Public policy is not served by ruling, 
as the Court did orally below, that, "This is a contest between 
two potential creditors,..." (T.28). Intervenor is not an 
ordinary creditor of the broker where her commissions are 
concerned. If Defendant had been allowed to present full facts 
at trial, the facts would have shown that she listed certain 
properties herself, she sold them herself, and relied only for 
supervision and licensing approval on Defendant broker. This 
certainly gives her more than the status of an ordinary creditor 
over that particular money. The sixty percent of the commission 
which was due to her under her contract with the broker, was her 
money, and did not belong to the broker* 
III. INTERVENOR IS ENTITLED, UPON PROOF OF THE FACTS AS 
SHE CLAIMS THEM TO BE, TO A DETERMINATION THAT ANY 
INTEREST OBTAINED BY THE BROKER IN HER REAL ESTATE 
COMMISSIONS, IS SUBJECT TO A RESULTING TRUST IN HER 
FAVOR, AND THAT THE BROKER'S CREDITORS MAY NOT REACH 
SAID COMMISSIONS. 
Intervenor does not admit that the legal title to the money 
due her as commissions has passed, or must pass, to the defendant 
broker. Nevertheless, legal title is not the issue. Whatever 
the Court.may decide regarding legal title, and the legal rights 
thereunder, Intervenor clearly has an equitable interest in the 
money due her for commissions. The doctrine of resulting trust 
in the State of Utah appears to have been first recognized as 
such by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Little vs. Alder, 
428 P.2d 156 (Utah 1967) in which the Court ruled that there is a 
rebuttable presumption that a resulting trust arises where no 
relationship exists between one who pays the purchase price and 
the transferee of property (428 P.2d at 157). 
The doctrine is closely related to the doctrine of 
constructive trust as referred to in Carnesecca vs. Carnesecca, 
572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977) where the Court stated: 
Equity will impress a constructive trust upon property 
in favor of a beneficiary of an oral trust under certain 
circumstances and no writing evidencing an intention to 
create a trust is required. Such is an equitable remedy 
arising by operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment 
and is not within the statute of frauds. The fact that 
parol evidence is admitted to prove its existence 
neces sa r i l y requ i res the showing by c l e a r and convincing 
e v i d e n c e . 572 P.2d a t 710. 
The c lose r e l a t i o n s h i p between the types of t r u s t i s a l so 
seen in the case of Hawkins v. Perry, 253 P.2d 372 when the Court 
declared the exis tence of a cons t ruc t ive t r u s t over r e a l property 
which one person h e l d on an o r a l agreement to be t r a n s f e r r e d to a 
minor when he became of age. The house was paid for with money 
be long ing to the minor; and the t r u s t was d e c l a r e d a f t e r the 
r ecord owner's wife a t t empted to o b t a i n an i n t e r e s t in the 
property as par t of her divorce ac t ion . 
Like a cons t ruc t ive t r u s t , a r e s u l t i n g t r u s t may be imposed 
to p r e v e n t un jus t en r ichment . The commissions c la imed by 
In tervenor are s o l e l y the r e s u l t of her own labor , and i t would 
c l e a r l y be unjust to enrich the P l a i n t i f f at In te rvenor f s 
expense. In tervenor has no duty whatsoever to support e i t he r her 
b r o k e r ' s former wife or t h e i r c h i l d r e n . Requi r ing her to do so 
or g i v e up her p r o f e s s i o n would be so un ju s t as to e n t i t l e her to 
an equ i t ab l e remedy to prevent i t . In tervenor l i v e s in a small 
c e n t r a l Utah town where the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a b r o k e r - a g e n t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not easy . If she c o n t i n u e s to work for t h i s 
broker under the circumstances imposed by the D i s t r i c t Court, she 
i s e n t i t l e d to no money whatsoever for her e n d e a v o r s . If she 
l e a v e s t h a t employment, she may w e l l not be a b l e to pursue her 
profession. Obviously, t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n which makes i t 
i m p o s s i b l e for her to con t inue her p r o f e s s i o n i s a q u e s t i o n of 
f a c t which t h e t r i e r of f a c t ough t t o c o n s i d e r i n i m p o s i n g a 
remedy* I n t e r v e n o r has been cut off from any a b i l i t y to p r e s e n t 
such f a c t s , and she should be a l lowed to do so . 
The major case in Utah r e g a r d i n g the o p e r a t i o n of r e s u l t i n g 
t r u s t s i s the Mat te r of E s t a t e of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982) 
where t he Court s t a t e d : 
The g e n e r a l r u l e f o r t h e c r e a t i o n of a p u r c h a s e money 
r e s u l t i n g t r u s t by o p e r a t i o n of law has been s e t out in 
Res ta tement (Second) of T r u s t s Sec t ion 440 (1959): 
Where a t r a n s f e r of p r o p e r t i e s i s made t o one 
p e r s o n and t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e i s p a i d by 
a n o t h e r , a r e s u l t i n g t r u s t a r i s e s in favor of 
t he person by whom the purchase p r i c e i s pa id , 
except as s t a t e d in S e c t i o n s 441 , 442 and 444. 
A s i m i l a r f o r m u l a t i o n of t h i s d o c t r i n e has been adopted 
i n U tah , Hawkins v s . P e r r y , 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 
( 1 9 5 3 ) , and we h a v e p r e v i o u s l y c i t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l 
S e c t i o n 440 of t h e R e s t a t e m e n t ( S e c o n d ) of T r u s t s . 
L i t t l e v s . A l d e r 19 Utah 2d 163 , 428 P.2d 156 ( 1 9 6 7 ) . 
The f a c t which must be p r o v e n in t h e c a s e of a p u r c h a s e 
money r e s u l t i n g t r u s t i s t h a t one p a r t y p a i d t h e 
purchase p r i c e for p r o p e r t y and another p a r t y was g iven 
l e g a l t i t l e . The r e c i t a l s i n t h e deed do no t p r e c l u d e 
e v i d e n c e o f t h e a c t u a l t r a n s a c t i o n . 
J a c k s o n v s . H e r n a n d e z , T e x a s , 155 Tex. 249 , 285 S.W.2d 
184 ( 1 9 5 6 ) . P r o f e s s o r S c o t t i n h i s t r e a t i s e on t r u s t s 
e x p l a i n s the i n t e rwork ing of t h e s e f a c t o r s : 
I f t h e r e ' s no e v i d e n c e as t o t h e i n t e n t i o n of 
t h e p a r t i e s , o t h e r t h a n t h e f a c t t h a t A pa id 
t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e fo r c o n v e y a n c e t o B, a 
r e s u l t i n g t r u s t a r i s e s i n f a v o r of A. I t i s 
u n n e c e s s a r y f o r A t o i n t r o d u c e f u r t h e r 
e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e t r u s t was i n t e n d e d , s i n c e 
the c h a r a c t e r of the t r a n s a c t i o n i t s e l f r a i s e s 
t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t B was n o t t o t a k e t h e 
p rope r ty b e n e f i c i a l l y . 5 S c o t t , Law of T r u s t s 
S e c t i o n 440 (3d ed . 1967) . 655 P.2d a t 1115. 
Whi l e I n t e r v e n o r ha s pa id no money fo r t h e t r a n s f e r of 
property (or money) to Acres West Real Estate, Intervenor 
obviously has provided a service, the result of which was the 
transfer of that money. Under the doctrine of resulting trust, 
"It is essential that there be an actual payment of money, 
property, or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable 
consideration." 76 Am. Jur.2d Section 206 (emphasis added). 
Clearly, whether or not title to the money vested in Defendant, 
or whether it passes through to Intervenor, the result is the 
same. Any interest Defendant has in the money owed to Intervenor 
for real estate and rental commissions, as may be proved at 
trial, is held in trust specifically for Intervenor. The 
defendant broker has no right or ability to pass on any interest 
that he may have to any third party, and no ordinary creditor of 
his may assert an interest therein. If Intervenor can show the 
facts as she states them, she is entitled to the benefit of a 
resulting trust. She has been precluded from making that 
showing, and this case should be remanded with instructions to 
the trial Court to give her that opportunity. 
CONCLUSION 
Intervenor, by having her amended complaint in intervention 
dismissed prior to trial, has been denied an opportunity to show 
facts adequate to entitle her to the real estate commissions she 
claims. She should be given the opportunity to make her proof, 
and this Court should give guidance to the trial Court by ruling 
that her causes of action are valid, subject to proof thereon. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
_- ..CM-
W. Andrew McCullough / 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /^ c day of April, 1989, I 
did mail four true and correct copies of the above and foregoing 
Brief Appellant, postage prepaid, to Marcella L. Keck, Attorney 
for Plaintiff and Respondent, 9 Exchange Place, Suite 808, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111; and to Eldon A. Eliason, Attorney for 
Defendant and Respondent, P.O. Box 605, Delta, Utah 84624. 
ADDENDUM 
™ ^
I O C L E R K O F T H E 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
MILLARD COUNTY 
- CIc :: 
Depmy JLLL 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • A 
CARRIE JO LAW, 
-vs-
ROBERT FRANK LAW, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER CV. 7860 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********************* 
The Court having considered Lynne Larson's motion to 
intervene will grant that motion. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
intervention as of right "when the applicant claims an interest 
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of 
the action. . . . " Ms. Larson's claim to part of the money in 
the bank account certainly gives her the required interest in the 
property. 
The Court is concerned that Ms. Larson seems to be 
represented in this intervention action by the plaintiff's 
attorney. Because of the potential for conflicts of interest, 
the Court would suggest that Ms. Larson obtain her own 
independent counsel. 
* \ -
Counsel for Plaintiff to prepare an order incorporating 
the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to filing with the Court for signature. 
Dated this 2nd day of September, 1988. 
BY T 
cc: Eldon A. Eliason Esq. 
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LULLA* '~**T 
^ " W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (A2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CARRIE JO LAW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FRANK LAW, 
Defendant, 
M. LYNNE LARSON, 
Intervenor. 
* f
 S J • - . -. 
COMPLAINT IN 
INTERVENTION 
Civil No. 7860 
—-oooOooo 
COMES NOW the Intervenor in the above-entitled action who 
complains of Plaintiff and for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1* Plaintiff and Defendant were previously husband and wife, 
and are now divorced, 
2. Intervenor is a licensed real estate sales associate 
affiliated with Acres West Real Estate, a real estate agency owned 
by Defendant herein, as Real Estate Broker, 





























sold three properties for which Security Title Company of Millard 
County has handled the title work and closings. 
4. That she is due, from the funds held by Security Title, 
commissions as follows: from transaction no. 87EM026, the sum of 
$742.50, from transaction no. 88EM023, the sum of $486.00 and from 
transaction no. 88EM028, the sum of $1140.00. 
5. On or about June 21, 1988 Plaintiff caused to be served 
upon Security Title of Millard County a writ of garnishment in an 
attempt to garnish funds due from Security Title of Millard County 
to Defendant herein. 
6. Plaintiff has claimed, through various motions filed with 
this Court, and claims made with Security Title of Millard County, 
that she is due all sums to be paid by Security Title of Millard 
County to Acres West Real Estate Agency, including those amounts 
due to Intervenor as a result of listing and/or sales of real 
estate. 
7. The commissions due to Intervenor as aforesaid are the 
sole property of Intervenor and are not subject to garnishment or 
execution by Plaintiff or any other person claiming to be a 
creditor of Defendant. 
8. Intervenor is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the 
commissions earned by her are her own separate property and not 





























WHEREFORE, Intervenor prays judgment as follows: 
1. For a declaratory judgment that funds due to her as earned 
commissions as a sales associate with Acres West Real Estate are 
her own personal property and not subject to garnishment or 
execution by either Plaintiff or Defendant herein. 
2. For an order of this Court directing Plaintiff to cease 
and desist from her efforts to garnish or execute on commissions 
due to Intervenor. 
3. For a declaratory judgment that Intervenor is owed the sum 
of $2368.50 as commissions from transactions 87EM026, 88EM023 and 
88EM028 and that such sums are due and payable upon closing of 
those transactions. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
equitable and proper in the premises. 
DATED this jZCT day of October, 1988. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Intervenor 





























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e t ? Q t S . T of O c t o b e r , 1 9 8 8 . I d i d 
m a i l a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e above and f o r e g o i n g Compla int 
i n I n t e r v e n t i o n , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t o M a r c e l l a L. Keck, A t t o r n e y 
f o r P l a i n t i f f , 9 E x c h a n g e P l a c e , S u i t e 8 0 8 , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
8 4 1 1 1 and t o E l d o n A. E l i a s o n , A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t , P.O. Box 




£ CX-OFUCIO CLERK O-
DI3T1UCT COUP! 
f\ QCfMO 1S88 
• ' - i ^ 
John D. Parken (2518) Bi-ULARD COUN1 
Marcella L. Keck (4063) < 
Attorneys for Plaintiff -A-te- Dc 
PARKEN & KECK 
Suite 808 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 596-2920 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




MOTION TO DISMISS 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
v. : Civil No. 7860 
ROBERT FRANK LAW, 
Defendant, 
M. LYNNE LARSON, 
Intervenor. 
—oooOooo— 
Plaintiff, by and through her counsel, MarceUa L. Keck, and 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure hereby moves this Court for an Order dismissing Intervenor 
Complaint in Intervention or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment 
against Intervenor. This Motion is based upon Ihtervenor's failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted or, in the alternative, this Motion is 
based upon there being no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
Plaintiffs entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. 
This Motion is supported by the pleadings on file in this matter, 
together with Plaintiff's Memorandum in support of this Motion. 
DATED this y ^ d a y of October, 1988. 
PARKEN & KECK 
By MM\J{4<^ 
Marcella L. Keck 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of October, 1988, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss or, in the 
alternative, for Summary Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Eldon A. Eliason 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 605 
Delta, UT 84620 
W. Andrew McCullough 
McCullough, Jones & Ivins 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, UT 84058 
^JfAMiiX^^miauije^ ^  
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i\L . » 
together with Plaintiff's Memorandum in support of this Motion. 
DATED this _2HLday of October, 1988. 
PARKEN & KECK 
By mAulUU^ 
Mar cella L. Keck 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAIUNG CERTIHCATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of October, 1988, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss or, in the 
alternative, for Summary Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Eldon A, Eliason 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 605 
Delta, UT 84620 
W. Andrew McCullough 
McCullough, Jones & Ivins 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 





































W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (A2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CARRIE JO LAW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FRANK LAW, 
Defendant, 
M. LYNNE LARSON, 
Intervenor. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
IN INTERVENTION 
Civil No. 7860 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the Intervenor herein and, pursuant to Rule 15 
U.R.C.P., moves the Court for an order granting leave for 
Intervenor to amend her Complaint in Intervention. This motion 
is made on the grounds that the original Complaint in 
Intervention was filed with incomplete and/or inaccurate 
information, based upon information that was misunderstood by 
counsel for Intervenor. This amendment is necessary to 





























T h i s m o t i o n i s b a s e d upon t h e Memorandum of P o i n t s and 
A u t h o r i t i e s s u b m i t t e d h e r e w i t h . 
DATED t h i s / day of November, 1988. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
W. Andrew McCul lough 
At torney for I n t e r v e n o r 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on the / day of November, 1988 , 
I d i d m a i l a t r u e and c o r r e c t c o p y of t h e a b o v e and f o r e g o i n g 
M o t i o n f o r L e a v e t o Amend C o m p l a i n t i n I n t e r v e n t i o n , p o s t a g e 
p r e p a i d , t o M a r c e l l a Keck, A t t o r n e y for P l a i n t i f f , 9 Exchange 
P l a c e , S u i t e 8 0 8 , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1 , and t o E l d o n A. 
E l i a s o n , A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t , P.O. Box 6 0 5 , D e l t a , Utah 





























W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (A2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CARRIE JO LAW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT FRANK LAW, 
Defendant, 





Civil No. 7860 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the Intervenor in the above-entitled action who 
complains of Plaintiff and for causes of action alleges as 
follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were previously husband and wife, 
and are now divorced. 
2. Intervenor is a licensed real estate sales associate 






























by Defendant herein, as Real Estate Broker. 
3. Over the last several months, Intervenor has listed and 
sold three properties for which Security Title Company of Millard 
County and/or Utah Title Company has handled the title work and 
closings. 
4. That she is due, from the funds held by Security Title 
and/or Utah Title, commissions as follows: from transaction no. 
87EM026, the sum of $742.50, from transaction no. 88EM023, the sum 
of $486.00 and from transaction no. 88EM028, the sum of $1140.00. 
5. On or about June 21, 1988 Plaintiff caused to be served 
upon Security Title of Millard County and Utah Title writs of 
garnishment in an attempt to garnish funds due from Security Title 
of Millard County and Utah Title to Defendant herein. 
6. Plaintiff has claimed, through various motions filed with 
this Court, and claims made with Security Title of Millard County 
and Utah Title, that she is due all sums to be paid by Security 
Title of Millard County and/or Utah Title to Acres West Real 
Estate Agency, including those amounts due to Intervenor as a 
result of listing and/or sales of real estate. 
7. The commissions due to Intervenor as aforesaid are the 
sole property of Intervenor and are not subject to garnishment or 
execution by Plaintiff or any other person claiming to be a 
creditor of Defendant. 
, Jon**, 
8. Intervenor is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the 
commissions earned by her are her own separate property and not 
subject to the claims of any other party hereto. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
1* Intervenor re-alleges paragraphs 1-8 of her first cause of 
action as though they were fully set forth herein. 
2. Acres West Realty, in addition to its business of selling 
homes, acts as a rental agent for certain rental properties in the 
Millard County area, which properties are owned by absentee 
landlords. 
3. Intervenor is due, as the leasing agent on certain of 
those properties, the sum of $608.41, which amount was due and 
payable from Defendants general account in his bank. 
4. Plaintiff has caused a writ of garnishment to be issued 
against Defendant's bank, holding his general account, including 
the amounts owed to intervenor. 
5. Intervenor is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the 
commissions earned by her are her own separate property and not 
subject to the claims of any other party hereto. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Intervenor re-alleges paragraphs 1-8 of her first cause of 






























2. Defendant herein, by operation of law, is a de facto 
trustee, and Intervenor is a de facto beneficiary, of a resulting 
trust whereby Defendant has come in to certain property conveyed 
to him as the result of the efforts of Intervenor. 
3. Because of the resulting trust, the amounts claimed by 
Intervenor herein as set forth above, are sole and separate 
property of Intervenor and are not subject to the garnishment or 
other execution actions of Plaintiff herein 
WHEREFORE, Intervenor prays judgment as follows: 
1. For a declaratory judgment that funds due to her as earned 
commissions as a sales associate with Acres West Real Estate are 
her own personal property and not subject to garnishment or 
execution by either Plaintiff or Defendant herein. 
2. For an order of this Court directing Plaintiff to cease 
and desist from her efforts to garnish or execute on commissions 
due to Intervenor. 
3. For a declaratory judgment that Intervenor is owed the sum 
of $2368.50 as commissions from transactions 87EM026, 88EM023 and 
88EM028 and that such sums are due and payable upon closing of 
those transactions. 
4. For declaratory judgment that Intervenor is owed the sum 






























l a n d l o r d s . 
5. For a d e c l a r a t i o n of a r e s u l t i n g t r u s t upon any monies due 
I n t e r v e n o r a s a r e s u l t of her own l a b o r and an e x e m p t i o n of any 
f u n d s h e l d by D e f e n d a n t i n s u c h a t r u s t from any a c t i o n s by 
P l a i n t i f f t o e x e c u t e on D e f e n d a n t ' s p r o p e r t y . 
6 . For s u c h o t h e r and f u r t h e r r e l i e f a s t h e C o u r t deems 
e q u i t a b l e and proper i n t h e p r e m i s e s . 
DATED t h i s J/o^ day of October , 1988. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
U.CZjtl 
W. Andrew McCullough 





























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l nerebv certiiv tnat on cue October, 1988, I did 
mail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Complaint 
in Intervention, postage prepaid, to Marcella L. Keck, Attorney 
for Plaintiff, 9 Exchange Place, Suite 808, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 and to Eldon A. Eliason, Attorney for Defendant, P.O. Box 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT_ ^ &£. 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
******************* 
CARRIE JO LAW, 
-vs-
ROBERT FRANK LAW, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
CASE NUMBER 7860 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* * * * • • • * * * * * * * * * • * * • * 
The Court, having considered intervenor Lynn Larson's 
motion to amend judgment, and her motion to stay execution, will 
deny those motions. Judge Walquist who heard this matter on 
November 9th, 1988, is a Senior District Court Judge, and it is 
not within the jurisdiction of this Court to set aside his 
ruling. 
The Court notes that this divorce action has been 
within the legal system since 1985, which is an unusually long 
time for such a case. In the interest of fairness to the 
parties, and of judicial economy, the Court would urge counsel in 
this matter to do all within their power to bring this case to a 
close as quickly as possible. 
Dated this 15th day of November, 1988. 
BY TH 
/ 
cc: Eldon A. Eliason, Esq. 
Marcella L. Keck, Esq. 
W. Andrew McCullough, Esq. 
HARDING, JUDG 
'., 
&. -X-OFFK:IO CLEKK OF 
DISTRICT COU21T 
John D. Parken (2518) fj£j ——£-—:-
Marcella L. Keck (4063) fj j JAN 0 !) 1983 
Attorneys for Plaintiff £3 I 
PARKEN & KECK T j ~ 7 7 7 £ ^ 7 £ n = — 
Suite 808 Boston Building KuLLAHD COUMT 
#9 Exchange Place 77 ~ CI 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 ~^±±- Dej 
Telephone: (801) 596-2920 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




Civil No. 7860 
ROBERT FRANK LAW, 
Defendant, 
M LYNNE LARSON, 
Intervenor. 
—000O000— 
The following matters came on for hearing before the above-
entitled Court, The Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding, on November 9, 
1988, at approximately 10:00 a.m.: Plaintiffs Motion for Order in Aid of 
Execution, Defendant's Motion for Stay of Execution, Intervenor's Motion 
to File Amended Complaint, and Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff was 
present and was represented by counsel Marcella L. Keck; Defendant was 
present and was represented by counsel Eldon A. Eliason; Intervenor was 
present and was represented by W, Andrew McCuUough. Argument was 
1 
made by all counsel with regard to the various motions pending. Among 
other things, Plaintiff argued that whatever the Court's ruling, all funds 
attached through Writ of Garnishment of which there was no dispute by 
Lynne Larson, should be released to the Plaintiff. Both Defendant and 
Intervenor agreed. It was represented to the Court that Intervenor's interest 
was approximately 60% of all funds held and Defendant's interest was 40%. 
Upon the Court's inquiry, it was represented by counsel for Defendant that 
Defendant was not insolvent, had not filed a bankruptcy petition, and no 
bankruptcy petition was imminent. The Court, having heard argument of 
counsel, including Intervenor's arguments with regard to the basis of her 
claims, inter alia, her claim that the funds attached by Plaintiff belonged to 
her by virtue of a "resulting trust," determined that the basis of Intervenor's 
claims were essentially those of a creditor and that in the context of the 
garnishment proceedings, she had failed to state a claim in which relief could 
be granted. Based upon the arguments of counsel and good cause appearing 
therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Intervenor's Motion to File an Amended 
Complaint be and hereby is granted and that Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss the 
Amended Complaint in Intervention be and is hereby granted; and it is 
FURTHER ORDERED that all funds subject to garnishment 
as of the date of the hearing be released to the Plaintiff, and it is 
2 
* ij J ^ C , 
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for an Order 
in Aid of Execution be and is hereby granted consistent with the terms 
requested in Plaintiffs Motion. 
DATED this >S day ^ ^ n b e r , 198§? 
Approved as to Form: 
Eldon A* Eliason 
Attorney for Defendant 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Intervenor 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 1988, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Eldon A. Eliason 
P. O. Box 605 
Delta, UT 84624 
W. Andrew McCuUough 
McCuUough, Jones & Jensen 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, UT 84057 
{jdrnz^.Trt^w/^L 
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